



THE IMPLICATION OF THE CONSTRUCTIVISM THEORY OF IR ON THE PAKISTAN AS MAIN NUCLEAR POWER STATE OF SOUTH ASIA

Nisar Ahmed Chandio

PhD Scholar, Department of International Relations, University of Sindh, Jamshoro. Nis.quaidian84@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to see if a constructivist theory can be utilized to analyze Pakistani behavior in the context of Indo-Pakistani relations. The research paper examines double case studies for making a point, namely the Kashmir issue and Pakistan's nuclear weapons, using a constructivist approach where possible. The research paper builds on the hypothesis that using a non-traditional IR approach can shed fresh light on key points in the two case studies under consideration, allowing for the discovery of new connections between them. Throughout the research work, an empirical-analytical approach is employed to test constructivism's hypothesis.

Keywords: Constructivism theory, Pakistan, Nuclear armaments, Identity, India, Kashmir dispute, South Asia

INTRODUCTION

The Indo-Pak conflict began in August 1947, when both countries were partitioned. Since then, there have been four wars and numerous border skirmishes between Islamabad and New Delhi.



Inability to resolve this stalled conflict frequently leads to recurrent war crimes and countless casualties.

Diplomatic ties between Pakistan and India should be of great importance, not because of the length of their struggle, but also because both countries are nuclear powers with large populations. (Jeffrey & Marc., 2001). A possible nuclear escalation or even a nuclear heroism would have disastrous effects. Pakistan has been under US protection and has performed an essential role as an official non- NATO ally state of the America in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan.

Many historians employ classic rationalist theories, particularly neo-realism, to explain the Indo-Pakistani war. The goal of this paper is to see if a reflectivity approach, namely social constructivism, can explain Pakistani behavior in this protracted conflict with India instead. Many facts may be regarded in a new light with a new perspective to this problem, and to serve as motivation in the use of new policies in seeking to resolve stalemated conflicts.

The constructivist approach and issues of identity are discussed extensively in the first section of this paper. The rest of the paper applies constructivism to events in the long-running Kashmir dispute as well as Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. This research paper focuses mostly on Pakistan's territory, with case examples ranging from the partition of both countries from their colonial master to till date.

LITERATURE REVIEW

In the realm of international relations, constructivism is a relatively new approach. Various scholars have opted to adopt it to the situation, either directly or indirectly by addressing constructivist features in their academic work. Explaining India's Nuclearization: Engaging Realism and Social Constructivism, by Runa Das, looks at how the new Indian state's leaders

conveyed nationalism, national identities, and perceived (in)securities in relation to India's nuclearization. (Runa., 2008).

The topic of identity is explored further, with information drawn from Anatol Lieven's book *Pakistan, (A Hard Country)*. He is a political observer, and terrorist expert, and focuses on Pakistan's identity and the inseparable kinship at the heart of the country. Even though R. Das' piece is on India rather than Pakistan, (Transparency International., 2011). and enormous social disparities. "Pakistan is in fact a great deal more like India – or India like Pakistan – than any country cares to recognize," writes A. Lieven (Anatol., 2011). As a result, it's interesting seeing if constructivism may be applied to the Pakistani situation as well.

K. Alan Kronstadt's doctoral thesis, *What Drives Subcontinental Insecurity: A Multi-theoretical Examination of the India-Pakistan Conflict Dyad*, provided additional inspiration. Kronstadt, a South Asian Affairs specialist at the Congressional Research Service, is interested in regional nuclearization and the Kashmir issue. He points out that constructivism can help resolve the conflict between India and Pakistan (K. Alan., 2013).

When the battle began in 1954, Josef Korbel's monograph *Danger in Kashmir* was a significant reference. His remarks were consistent with a constructivist perspective, which did not exist at the period when realism theory ruled international relations. Korbel foresaw a major threat arising in Kashmir half a century ago, one in which the identities of residents played a critical role.

In contrast to the classic realist method, the constructivist approach used to analyze Pakistan's nuclearization may also find support in Scott Douglas Sagan's essay, "What Motivates States to Develop Nuclear Weapons? Three Models on the Lookout for a Bomb," Stanford University is the author of this work. Professor Sagan devised three models to explain why governments pursue

nuclear armament in his work, which is today considered a classic contribution in the field of IR. He says that, while the simple answer to this question appears to be that states seek nuclear weapons when they feel threatened and have no other option, the reality is more complicated (Scott Douglas.,1996). Nuclear weapons are more than just tools of national security; they're also political hot topics in domestic discussions and bureaucratic squabbles.

They can also act as transnational normative markers of modernity and identity, posing a challenge to the status quo (Scott Douglas.,1996). This is consistent with constructivism, which emphasizes identity and the interconnectedness of actors' actions and beliefs in shaping reality.

In his monograph *Pakistan: (Eye of the Storm)*, Owen Bennett Jones presents a very comprehensive overview of the Pakistani state, building on his own experience as a BBC journalist there. O. Bennett Jones the events preceding the development of the nuclear weapon and the Kashmir dispute are recounted, with critical remarks thrown in for good measure. As a result, his monograph served as a significant source of information for both case studies.

Research Question

Social constructivism may be used to explain Pakistan's actions in the Indo-Pakistani conflict, according to a related idea. "Is it possible to apply social constructivism to Pakistani behavior?"

METHODOLOGY

Throughout the research work, an empirical-analytical approach is employed to test constructivism's hypothesis. The analytical technique is utilized to see if constructivism holds true in the Pakistani example, while the (descriptive) method is employed in 'both case studies to outline the events that are important.

Theoretical framework

The first section is broken into two sections; the first is an introduction to constructivism as an approach to international relations, and how it relates to the Pakistani experience. The major characteristics of constructivism are discussed, as well as the many perspectives of social scientists working on the subject. The second section delves into the idea of identity, which is central to constructivist theory, and the Pakistani case is mentioned whenever feasible.

Social Constructivism

While speaking on constructivism, Petr Drulák, Director of the Institute of International Relations in Prague, it is claimed that there are significant differences in the field of IR. These are based on the question of whether it is a theory, an analytical framework, or an approach in the conventional sense. Some believe that its identity is still a mystery since it is a relatively new method of thinking in the field of international relations. (Originating in the late 1980s) (Petr., 2013). "Most IR theories, on the other hand, include some amount of commitment to the idea that international politics are socially produced." Almost no theory contends that international political outcomes are the result of historical and agentic contingency rather than a foregone conclusion of nature." (Patrick Thaddeus & Daniel H., 2004). Alexander Wendt, Wendt (1999), Constructivism as a theory, or rather, as a way of systematic thinking, was sought to be elevated by a well-known American academic. In his work, *Social Theory of International Politics*, he introduces constructivism as an IR theory. According to many constructivists, constructivism, on the other hand, encompasses a wide range of viewpoints and inclinations. Constructivism is not a substantive political theory, but rather a "social theory that makes assertions about the nature of social existence and social development." (Christine., 2010).

Maja Zehfuss's, Zehfuss (2002) monograph, *Constructivism in International Relations*, among many others, provides a thorough critique of constructivism. "There is disagreement not only about whether constructivism is healthy for us but also, given the intellectual diversity of work branded constructivist, about what it is in the first place," she writes at the start of her work (Zehfuss., 2002).

Almost everyone is a constructivist about some topics, as pointed out by André Kukla, emeritus professor at the University of Toronto. He claims that some social realities, such as facts about social institutions, languages, social classes, governments, legal systems, economic systems, and family systems, are the result of human actions, ideas, and intentions. (André., 2000). Constructivism holds that reality in IR is socially constructed, meaning that it is formed and sustained by IR actors' speech and behavior. As a result, there isn't always a single objective reality (Petr.,2013). In terms of Pakistan, despite decades of stalemate conflict, the country's behavior and policies toward India have evolved over time, as have the actors involved in the acts, as well as Pakistani culture. Constructivists, use sociological theories and philosophical methods to treat structure and actor as equals and show their interdependence (Petr.,2013). Constructivism emphasizes "the centrality of ideas, identity, and interaction in the international system," revealing "how the human world is not merely given and/or natural, but rather an artifice; that it is "built" by the actors' own activities." Christine (Christine, 2010).

The primary constructivist method is to place actors' actions, beliefs, and interests in context, and to recognize that the world they live in was created and shaped by them, and hence must have an effect on them (Christine., 2010). Understanding a state's society, in this case, Pakistan's, as well as the underlying beliefs and narratives that influence people's thinking, is therefore critical for

constructivists, and may provide an explanation where other IR approaches/theories fail. "Identities are the basis of interests," as A. Wendt puts it, or, to put it another way, identities are significant. The third premise is that agents and structures are mutually formed. Individual actors' meaning and identity, as well as patterns of right economic or political behavior, are established by institutionalized norms and notions. (Christian., 2001).

The traditional constructivists make up the first group. They accept "key aspects of neorealist systemic theorizing, such as the centrality of the state and the importance of a scientific or positivist approach to comprehend phenomena," as well as "key aspects of neorealist systemic theorizing, such as the centrality of the state and the importance of a scientific or positivist approach to comprehend phenomena." (Christine., 2010).

A. Wendt, like his fellow traditional constructivists, sees constructivism as a link between rationalist and reflectivity methods, allowing both to benefit from the knowledge of the other. On the other hand, critical constructivists see positivism as a problem, claiming that "the dichotomy between the ideational and the material world simply reproduces the binary distinctions that characterize positivist methodology (such as strong/weak)." Christine (Christine, 2010).

Traditional constructivism will be observing a strategy for assessing Pakistan's situation in this paper, as examining the (Indo-Pak) conflict through rationalist lenses which should not be overlooked.

Concept identity of sovereign states with reference to Pakistan

The concept of (identity) is one of constructivism's basic components, likewise, constructivists see states as types of things to which identities and interests can be attributed (Wendt., 1999). While writing about identity, it is also vital to stress that, like the entire notion of constructivism, its

function in international politics is debatable. Identity is not an issue for Kenneth Waltz, the foremost proponent of neorealism. As sovereigns, all states share a common identity, and this sovereignty determines their vast anarchic environment. The word identity is employed in a variety of contexts & is linked to several other concepts such as discourse, power, interests, institutions, psychology, and method (Karin Marie., 2015).

While defining identity in broad terms and in a philosophical sense, A. Wendt remarked, "Identity is whatever makes things what they are" (Wendt., 1999). However, because it is such a broad description, A. Wendt defines identity as "a property of international actors that causes motivational and behavioral inclinations." "This shows that, at its core, identity is a subjective or unit-level attribute dependent on an actor's self-perception." (Wendt., 1999).

However, as A. Wendt points out, both external and internal processes shape identities. It is determined not just by how an actor perceives himself, but also by how others see him. He says that two sorts of beliefs might shape identity: those held by the Self and those held by others. (Wendt., 1999). The idea of identity also implies the existence of several identities and the ability to switch between them (Karin Marie., 2015). As K. M. Fierke, Professor of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, illustrates with the United Kingdom as an example, identity implies plurality. As can be seen, the UK's identity may be viewed in a variety of ways: as a democracy, a part of Europe with a special relationship to the US, the Commonwealth's leader, or a formal imperial power. (Karin Marie., 2015).

The same strategy might be used in Pakistan, which is the subject of this paper. Pakistan is a nuclear power with one of Asia's most powerful armies. It is also a member of international organizations and regional organizations such as SAARC and UNO.

A. Lieven explains in his monograph *Pakistan, (A Hard Country)* that Pakistan being a state is weak, but Pakistani society is powerful (Anatol., 2011). In his work, A. Lieven emphasizes the relevance of identities in Pakistan. He explains that Pakistan would never be able to unite behind any issue because its society is made up of multiple layers of identities that merge, overlap, and form the state. "However, with Pakistanis, there is often a wheel inside a wheel, an identity within an identity that overlaps with another identity." (Anatol., 2011). According to A. Lieven, kinship and its networks are critical in the development of Pakistani politics. This is something to keep in mind when dealing with Pakistan.

Kashmir conflict

The major events of the Kashmir conflict in the Indian subcontinent between India and Pakistan, as well as other inter-territorial disputes, are viewed from a constructivist viewpoint. In circumstances where there was a minimal resemblance to constructivism, the neorealist theory was given consideration. The case study is broken into three sections and highlights key periods in the stalemated conflict.

Arvin Bahl's monograph *From Jinnah to Jihad* investigates why realism fails to account for Pakistan's aspiration for Kashmir?. He claims that waging a confrontation over Kashmir will cost Pakistan a lot of money, but not India. Because Pakistan is a weak state, power is concentrated in the hands of a small group of elites. (Arvin, 2007). The elite act primarily in the interests of the Punjabi ethnic community, for whom Kashmir holds unique emotional significance (Arvin, 2007). The findings of A. Bahl could be bolstered by A. Lieven's research, which emphasizes the importance of identification and nationalism. While looking at the conflict via realism's glasses, A. Kronstadt believes that "the varied and oftentimes religious identities of Indians, Pakistanis,

and Kashmiris" (K. Alan., 2013). cannot be simply explained. They are also "deeply and inexorably embroiled in the Kashmir dispute," according to many commentators. (Arvin, 2007). "Like it or not, the Kashmir dispute is, in no small measure, a religious dispute," he continues, citing South Asian political specialist and IR Robert G. Wirsing (Arvin, 2007). Given this, a link may be drawn between religion and constructivism, as religion is an intrinsic element of identity, which is inextricably linked to constructivism.

The Kashmir conflict was not just a struggle over a piece of land, but rather a struggle between two ways of life, political notions, values, and spiritual attitudes that find themselves "trapped in fatal conflict," according to Josef Korbel (Josef., 1954). Long before the current country was formed, Pakistan has "spiritual attitudes" and values that push the Pakistani state to act in a certain way. (Josef., 1954).

Other Indo-Pakistani issues, at least according to both countries, appear to stem from the war over this historic princely state beneath the Himalaya Mountains. To give just one example, General Pervez Musharraf said of nuclear bomb tests, "If the international community had helped resolve the Kashmir crisis and ensured Pakistan's security, we might not have tested." (K. Alan., 2013) A. Lieven considers the Kashmir dispute to be a highly sensitive topic, and the land is even an obsession for Pakistan.

Although he considers the military to be a good institution in some ways, he points out that its obsession with India in general and Kashmir, in particular, has caused turmoil in Pakistan (Anatol., 2011). Speech acts have the potential to affect the thoughts of thousands of people, thus they should not be taken lightly. "Kashmir must be liberated if Pakistan is to have its full meaning," According to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistani leaders share responsibility for persuading ordinary

Pakistanis to accept jihad. (Anatol., 2011). Since the partition of the subcontinent 74 years ago, Pakistan's notion that the subcontinent is inexorably divided into two nations: Muslims and Hindus, and that India has no such distinction, has been imprinted in the country's worldview. (Anatol., 2011). According to Sumantra Bose, an Associate Professor of Comparative Politics at the London School of Economics and Political Science, the Kashmir dispute has evolved from a dispute over a border territory into "a problem for the subcontinent and the world." The conflict between India and Pakistan is an interstate conflict that can be used to examine social constructivism in the context of Pakistan (Sumantra., 2005).

How Kashmir issue originated?

The Kashmir conflict dates back to the conditions of the two countries' independence from Britain and the division of the subcontinent in 1947 (Sumantra., 2005). To understand the Kashmiri struggle and provide an analysis, it is vital to describe what transpired in Kashmir decades ago. The dictatorial monarch of Kashmir, like the rulers of the other princely countries, faced a serious issue in 1947. It was an important decision because they were debating whether to join India's or Pakistan's side. Kashmir has a big population, and its geopolitical significance, particularly in light of its proximity to China and Russia, should not be overlooked. (Owen., 2009). Jinnah wanted to gain Kashmir because he believed it would fall into India's lap like a "ripped-off fruit" and India wanted it because its ruler was a Hindu, and the land was adjacent to India. The Maharaja may have imagined himself as an independent king, first and foremost a Kashmiri and then a Hindu, but Pakistan placed a premium on his state's mainly Muslim character (Ramachandra., 2007). On 3 October 1947, in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, pro-Pakistan chieftains in western Jammu districts

declared the formation of a provisional "Azad" Jammu and Kashmir administration, taking a risk as the war progressed. (Sumantra., 2005).

Thousands of Pashtun tribesmen invaded J&K on October 21, 1947, and despite Pakistan's claims, the raid showed traces of organization and strategy. When confronted with this invasion, the Maharaja felt he had no choice but to request help from India, which he did on the condition that he sign the Instrument of Accession. In November 1947, fighting broke out in earnest, lasting until December, when the Indian Cabinet decided to refer the matter to the United Nations. (Sumantra., 2005). Many people understood the significance of Kashmir's strategic importance, but constructivists could object that Pakistan launched its offensive not only to pursue a strategic territory, but also to pursue its vision of a Muslim state that encompasses all Muslims (Christine., 2010).

Kashmir issue from the period 50s till 80s.

India believed it had made headway in Indian-administered Kashmir and that there would be no more talk of a referendum. The theft of a Muslim religious relic from a shrine near Srinagar in 1963 sparked a wave of anger among Kashmir's Muslims. Pakistan decided it was time to try its luck once more, believing that the Muslim population was on its side. The conflict of 1965 broke out as Pakistan felt secure because of its close ties with the United States (Owen.,2009). The 1965 war between India and Pakistan was the start of what is now known as the Indo-Pakistan War, which ended with both sides agreeing on a ceasefire line (Owen.,2009). In 1971, India and Pakistan went to war over Bangladesh's independence, which was only tangentially related to the Kashmir dispute. Z. A. Bhutto met with Indira Gandhi, her Indian counterpart, in Simla in 1972,

and signed the so-called Simla Agreement (Rathnam.,2012). Because neither country was willing to let the Siachin glacier go, it became a mutually destructive standoff.

In 1984, India placed troops on the glacier in response to newly publicized Pakistani maps depicting the glacier under Pakistani control (Owen.,2009). Anti-Indian sentiment intensified progressively in the 1980s as India's treatment of Muslims in Kashmir was anything but democratic and just, giving Pakistan the opportunity to help its major foe's adversaries. The Muslim fundamentalist Jammait-I-Islam (JII) fought for an independent Kashmir, whereas the Jammu and Kashmir Peoples' League (JKPL) supported Pakistan (Rathnam.,2012).

In July 1988, the JKLF, with the help of Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence, set off a series of bombings in Srinagar. Estimates of casualties vary, but unbiased observers believe that 60 000 people have died since 1988. Despite this, "many more people died as a result of this insurgency than in the combined conflicts of 1947 and 1965"(Owen.,2009).

The period from the 1990s Onwards

Ramachandra (2007) says, Militants targeted Kashmiri Pandits, who are Hindus by birth but share the same culture as Kashmiri Muslims, as agents of a state that had long oppressed the Kashmiris. In the early 1990s, the Kashmir Valley was home to an estimated 200 000 Pandits; by the end of the decade, only 4,000 remained. By the year 2000, Pakistan had 30,000 madrasas, 24 armed religious militias, and a rise in religious sentiment had enhanced Pakistan's commitment to Kashmir's "liberation." Religious school.

Kavita and D.Suba (2008) The Indian government raised the number of troops stationed in Kashmir in response to the terrorist strikes. These soldiers, on the other hand, were harsh toward the villagers, who were progressively offering safe haven to the terrorists. Pakistan allowed Islamic

extremists to take control, and it started the Kargil war in 1999, giving the conflict a fresh push. Sumantra (2005) despite the fact that the army carried out Kargil and Nawaz Sharif was not the main originator, the disaster eventually brought down his civilian rule. Sumantra (2005) General Pervez Musharraf assumed power in Islamabad in October 1999 without revising Pakistan's official stance on Kashmir. "There is no other dispute," he stated emphatically.

Sumantra (2005) After Musharraf was overthrown in 2008, Pakistan resumed its tough posture toward India, but he refused to allow the Line of Control to become an international boundary. Pakistan's poor economic situation, the Kargil disaster, and the US' suspicious eye have all contributed to the country's international reputation as a "insecure, unreliable, belligerent, unsophisticated, and fantasist" state.". *Kashmir profile (2012)* Recent events in Kashmir show that the situation remains stalled, as it has for the past six decades. Disputes along the Line of Control continue to arise, with gunfire occasionally being exchanged. According to the BBC, several Pakistani soldiers were killed in open fire across the LoC in 2011, with India accusing Pakistani troops of starting the clash.

Owen (2009) The Kashmir issue, it was said, has not only diverted attention away from more important national goals such as poverty alleviation, but it has also contributed to a destabilizing radicalization of opinion among Pakistan's youth. Many facts, as well as the opinions of respectable political scientists, speak in favor of constructivism considering all that has been stated thus far.

Pakistani Nuclear armament

In contrast to a realist's nuclear deterrence strategy, the second case study investigates Pakistan's nuclear armament to examine if a constructivist perspective can explain Pakistan's behavior. This

part talks about Pakistan's nuclear program, which will look at the country's efforts to obtain nuclear weapons using a constructivist perspective. When appropriate, the room will be given to neorealism, as it was in the first case study, to examine how Pakistan's leadership viewed its nuclear program.

S. D. Sagan, the author, debates three theoretical frameworks, or "models," that explain why states choose to create or not develop nuclear weapons. According to the security paradigm, states go nuclear to increase national security, primarily in response to external nuclear threats. Nuclear weapons are seen as fulfilling parochial bureaucratic or political aims in the internal politics model, which focuses primarily on local political players. Scott Douglas (1996) suggested that the suggested model proposed is the "norms model," which highlights the symbolic functions that nuclear weapons can play in shaping a state's identity.

McLeod, D. (2016). D. Duncan McLeod describes India and Pakistan as two countries with Lockean anarchy in common. Duncan (2008) suggested "Having exhausted all peaceful political and diplomatic channels to settle disagreements at both national, regional, and international levels, the risk of resorting to violence remains clear," D. McLeod adds. If ideological tensions between Pakistan and the United States stay high, a return to armed war is a foregone conclusion, he writes. As a result, India and Pakistan's hostile relationship, combined with the existence of nuclear weapons, might be a potentially lethal combination. Šumit and S.Paul (2010) suggested Studying the consequences of proliferation in the region, as well as Pakistani behavior in this regard, could be beneficial.

The author R. Das argues that the common viewpoint on this issue is a realistic one, as it is in the Pakistani in this case, Pakistan would be regarded as a "strong state" doing everything it can, which

includes securing a nuclear deterrent, despite the fact that doing so is extremely expensive. Runa (2008) According to R. R. Das, a religiously driven political party in India has re-articulated Indian geopolitical space by "drawing on "culturally-situated" logic of (in)security to define Hindu rashtra's nuclear policy." As S. D. Sagan points out in his "domestic politics model," in which domestic players influence nuclear decision-making, identity and political leaders may play a role in Pakistan's quest for a nuclear weapon. (Scott., Douglas 1996).

Ansie and col 2007 suggested that In India's and Pakistan's nuclear-weapons positions, two sociological facts predominate. Both countries share the goal of being recognized as the region's dominant force. Ansie and col (2007) suggested because of their desire to "preserve their social identity," both countries created inter-subjective realities. The non-Proliferation Treaty suggests that this could indicate Pakistan's apprehension about India's nuclear weapons program. The long-running conflict between Pakistan and India is the second sociological fact. Both countries have never signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and have no plans to do so. There is no cooperation between these countries, and there are no IAEA inspections or verifications. As can be shown, constructivist lenses can bring a fresh perspective on a topic typically addressed by realists.

However, the question of whether nuclear weapons are logical remains unanswered. Owen (2009) suggested in 1965, that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto stated emphatically that Pakistan needed a nuclear weapon: "If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass or leaves; we will go famished, but we will get one of our own." It's arguable if this behavior is reasonable, because 'starving Pakistan out' to keep up with a much stronger India isn't always in Pakistan's best interests.

Pakistan starts intending to make a bomb

It's critical to follow Pakistan's nuclear race with India from the beginning to understand the motivations underlying its pursuit of the bomb. Attempts by both India and Pakistan to create nuclear weapons may be traced back to the early years after the partition. In 1954, India formed a Department of Atomic Research. Not long after, Pakistan formed the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). Even though PAEC was created with the goal of focusing on civilian nuclear power, its concentration has altered over time. (Sumit & S.Paul 2010).

All Pakistani administrations were active in the nuclear program, whether civil or military. Owen (2009) suggested that Pakistan's nuclear armament, according to O. Bennet Jones, is "a story of personal rivalry and institutional discord." Owen (2009) Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, renowned as "the father of Pakistan's bomb" and a national hero, supports one side, while PAEC advocates the other. Owen (2009) suggested even though A. Q. Khan should not be considered a religious zealot, his motivation must be understood as emanating from a "feeling of victimhood shared by Muslims all over the world." Owen (2009) said, he was a Pakistani nationalist born and raised in the West, but he despised it for undervaluing Pakistan and favoring India.

A. Q. Khan's strong sense of self-identity undoubtedly motivated him to do what he did, and his case for constructivism is compelling. Scott Douglas (1996) It's conceivable to assume that S.D. Sagan's "domestic politics model" and "norms model" coincide in this scenario. Khan was undoubtedly a member of the state's nuclear energy establishment and had access to information and the power to influence the nuclear weapons program. During the 1960s, Pakistan's nuclear aspirations were viewed as unsettling by the international world. The United States provided a \$350,000 grant to assist Pakistan develop its first research reactor. In 1964, Anatol (2011)

suggested that China was on the verge of conducting its first nuclear tests, posing a potential threat to India.

As a result, India has publicly lobbied for nuclear weapons, prompting Pakistan to seek Chinese aid. A summit with the Chinese side was conducted in Beijing in 1965, and Chinese support for Pakistan was formed, much to the delight of all there. (Carey.,2007). Why did Pakistan see India's nuclear deterrence as menacing, but China's was not? A constructivist viewpoint offers an explanation based on identities and constructed risks. The social construct of Indian "Others," in this case a potential Indian invasion of Pakistan, was possibly stronger than China's. Even though the Indian nuclear deterrent was not expressly aimed at Pakistan, it was viewed as such, and that was all that mattered.

Pakistan's dilemma is that its government declined to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. In practice, this implies Pakistan is free to build nuclear weapons. It was during the presidency of Z. A. Bhutto that Pakistan began to develop nuclear weapons - and he made the now-famous "we will eat grass" statement (Leonard S&, Jacqueline R., 2019).

All these circumstances are likely to have impacted his actions. He even wrote a book about Pakistan's nuclear program called *The Myth of Independence*, in which he argued his views on nuclear Pakistan. However, he had to wait a few more years to put his plan into reality, or, to put it another way, until he was appointed Prime Minister (Carey.,2007).

Multiple hurdles faced by Pakistan while making bomb

Pakistan realized after the war of 1971 that its military advantage, which had been established during many years of Muslim military dominance, was no longer valid. "Pakistan was severely crippled militarily, mentally, diplomatically, and politically as a result of the Bangladesh conflict."

Pakistan had established its nationhood upon the concept of a Muslim homeland, which was abruptly weakened by the Bengalis' secession, who preferred ethnicity over religion, but Pakistan blamed India for their own difficulties (K. Alan., 2009). Identity played a key part once again, and concerns that were originally domestic in nature became issues of a foreign nature (K. Alan., 2009).

A year after the defeat, Z. A. Bhutto had been following India's actions and had issued "a directive commanding the country's nuclear establishment to construct a nuclear device within three years." The date of Pakistan's nuclear program may be pinpointed to the year. The date was January 24, 1972. Z. A. Bhutto, Pakistan's prime minister, "maintained a nationalist tone" and emphasized the importance of the national interest, with the nuclear program serving as a symbol of opposition to India, Pakistan's traditional foe, and the United States, which tended to meddle in Pakistan's internal affairs (K. Alan., 2009).

Pakistan has two options when it came to nuclear weapons. A plutonium option would be one of them. Initially, Pakistan sought to obtain plutonium with the unintentional assistance of France. The truth was that Pakistan had no obvious need for plutonium, and its goals were entirely civilian, as claimed by the Pakistani government. The French were pleased, and they promptly signed a contract. (Owen., 2009).

Z. A. Bhutto's nuclear deal with France was a major setback for Pakistan, which once again protested that the West was single-handedly targeting it. To highlight the gravity of the situation, the US chose to cut both economic and military aid to Islamabad. It must be noted that France requested that any assistance provided in the form of a processing plant be subject to IAEA safeguards (Owen.,2009). With his critical expertise from the Netherlands, Dr. A. Q. Khan was a

significant actor in this operation. Pakistan started looking for uranium enrichment technologies in 1975. Pakistan chose the enrichment method as the second option accessible to it. Dr. Khan most likely obtained the necessary blueprints and supplier lists in the Dutch centrifuge enrichment factory in Almelo. (Leonard S&, Jacqueline R., 2019). The entire nuclear project was classified as top-secret, making it independent of the PAEC. "Construction of a pilot plant at Sihala began in 1978 and was completed the following year, while work on a full-scale facility at Kahuta began the following year." (Leonard S&, Jacqueline R., 1990).

Bhutto: "What difference does my life make now that I can envisage eighty millions of my people standing in a nuclear cloud under an undefended sky?". There is one fundamental difference between the Pakistani nuclear discussion and the Indian nuclear debate. There has always been wide national unanimity in Pakistan on the necessity of nuclearization, which has a lot to do with faith; in India, the subject has long been a matter of disagreement (K. Alan., 2009).

Pakistan has been able to construct a nuclear weapon in a short period of time in the event of war since the mid-1980s, making it a de facto nuclear-weapon state. In 1984, Dr. A. Q. Khan declared that the Kahuta plant had produced enriched uranium. President Zia soon followed up with a promise that only non-military materials had been manufactured (Leonard S&, Jacqueline R., 2019).

When Pakistan became a nuclear power state

With the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989, the US shone a new light on Pakistan's nuclear ambitions. The US invoked the Pressler Amendment 173 terms to be reinstated, mandating sanctions against countries that could not certify compliance with the Non-Proliferation

Treaty. Both India and Pakistan were hit by these sanctions, but Pakistan was hit more due to its smaller size and more susceptible economy (Temima,. 2013).

The turning point came in 1998, when India conducted nuclear tests on the 11th and 13th of May, prompting Pakistan to respond on the 28th and 30th of May. As a result, the nuclear ambiguity that surrounded these two countries was dispelled, and both countries were viewed as nuclear powers to be reckoned with (Hasan-Askari, 2001). Nonetheless, "the only formally pronounced form of Pakistani nuclear doctrine is the organization of the National Command Authority, which lays out the chain of command and control, and its constituents, such as the Employment Control Committee, the Development Control Committee, and the Strategic Plans Division," according to the (NCA) National Command Authority (Zafar.,2011). The rationale for this behavior, according to Zafar Iqbal Cheema, is "to preserve a level of deliberate ambiguity," but "Pakistan's nuclear decision-making echelon appears to be ignorant that ambiguities may be maintained even in copiously written documents." (Zafar.,2011).

Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was compelled to prepare for a possible response to India's nuclear test, even though he had considered not testing at all. Some key decision-makers opposed testing, such as navy head Admiral Fasih Bokhari, or army chief Jehangir Karamat, who advocated for a wait-and-see strategy (Owen.,2009).

Admiral F. Bokhari and the army commander J. Karamat advised Pakistani authorities against conducting nuclear tests but were defeated by R. Zaffar ul-Haq who sounded a strong nationalist note. Scott Douglas (1996) suggested that the "domestic politics" and "norms model" of S.D. Sagan could be applied here once more, and it appears that both models overlap.

When Pakistan opted to test nuclear weapons for the first time in 1998, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif claims the country had "no choice but to do it." "I never had any doubts when I was preparing the bomb," says A. Q. Khan. By the end of May 1998, Pakistan had become the world's eighth nuclear state, a year after testing its first nuclear device. (Owen.,2009).

Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998, 1998, and 2002, and announced in 2005 that it has enough nuclear weapons to provide a viable deterrent; however, the precise quantity is unknown. According to anonymous US sources, Pakistan's nuclear arsenal could be significantly superior to India's in 2002, according to American television network NBC. (Owen.,2009). Pakistan has resumed plutonium manufacture to enhance its nuclear weapons program. The first plutonium reactor in Khushab started producing plutonium in 1998, and a second reactor started producing plutonium in 2009. The construction of a third plutonium reactor appears to be nearing completion. Pakistan objected to the initiation of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty negotiations in 2011.

Discussion and Analysis

Many renowned scholars think it is evident that Pakistan's Identity is either expressly or implicitly, along with national and religious feelings, play a crucial role in Pakistani politics, determining its path more than anywhere else. A. Lieven, who has spent a significant amount of time in Pakistan, testifies to this subject in his superb book *Pakistan, a Hard Country*, which has been a very important resource for this article. The monograph was useful not only because it contained numerous direct quotes from significant players in Pakistani politics, but also because it was based on the author's own research and views on the issue.

The Kashmir dispute is the first case study, and it looks at the years leading up to 1947, the year of independence, as well as the events that led up to that day. A descriptive method was used to

understand the beginnings of the 'Kashmir struggle.' Jammu and Kashmir was a peaceful region ruled by a Hindu maharaja and populated by a majority of Muslims before partition. Nonetheless, with the partition of British India, both newly formed governments claimed they had the only right to claim Kashmir, and the situation has been a shambles ever since, fueled by mutual animosity and a strong feeling of shared identity in Pakistan. Pakistan's *raison d'être* has always been to provide a homeland for Muslims, as well as a home for Kashmiris. As a result, abandoning the region was inconceivable, even if it meant facing an India that was far more powerful.

The constructivist strategy was particularly effective in the case of Kashmir. A major emotional aspect is visible in Pakistani decision-making regarding Kashmir, and the conflict has cost Pakistan a significant amount of money over time. Despite the fact that this course of action does not appear to be particularly sensible, the Pakistanis have elevated the capture of the Kashmir Valley, which is of essentially no strategic relevance to Pakistan, to a high priority. The religious factor is especially prominent in Kashmir, where the clash between Hindu and Muslim religious concepts has worsened since the conflict began. Various religious beliefs link sentiments of numerous identities, which matches the constructivist pattern admirably.

Kashmir's bleak situation is exacerbated by the widely held belief in Pakistani society that only Pakistan is right. Regardless of how much political power the political elite and armed forces have, no Pakistani leader will ever dare to go against public opinion. This is also in line with constructivism, and it explains Islamabad's border blunders throughout the years.

The second case study, which concerns Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, is more complicated. The nuclear danger posed by India, Pakistan's principal adversary, is real, and it has surely induced fear and worry among Pakistanis. On the other hand, given Pakistan's capability and the unease it has

caused in the West, obtaining a nuclear deterrent has proven prohibitively expensive, leading to sanctions.

The paradigm of a rational state operating rationally is not, however, the only one that can be adopted. As evidenced by S. D. Sagan's "domestic politics model" and "norms model," which is also true in Pakistan, many additional aspects play a role in states' nuclear arming. The vested interests of local elites, as well as nuclear symbols and traditions stating that a certain course of action is legitimate and desirable, appear to be deeply embedded in Pakistani culture. This proved to be significant as well. Because both case studies established its application in the context of Pakistan, the hypothesis has been proven, and the answer to the research article, the research question is affirmative.

CONCLUSION

In the last, this paper centered fundamentally on Pakistan and its way of behaving toward its greater and more remarkable neighbor India. The improvement of Pakistan's action and course of activities towards New Delhi since the extended time of parcel was dissected by means of a constructivist's focal point and handled exhaustively in two contextual analyses, for example, the Kashmir question and Pakistan's atomic weapon. The paper started with the assumption and well-known fact that realism and neorealism were widely utilized to explain the Indo-Pakistani conflict, and Pakistan's behavior was even referenced as a model example of realism's compliance. As a result, the question of whether a social constructivist methodology could be applied to Pakistan in the context of Indo-Pakistani relations was raised as a research question. The theoretical framework was provided in the first part of the paper, and social constructivism was introduced as an approach that could be effective in shedding new light on the conflict.

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